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Introduction 
On March 11, 2016, a collective of Argentinian human rights groups wrote a letter to the 
United States Ambassador in Buenos Aires requesting that he solicit the cooperation of the 
United States government with “the process of Memory, Truth, and Justice concerning the 
crimes against humanity that were committed in our country during the last civic-military 
dictatorship.”1 The request echoed pleas to the United States from governments, human rights 
organizations, and individuals throughout Latin America. This sentiment, that the United States 
had the ability, and the obligation, to help in the ongoing reconciliation process for countries in 
Latin America had a firm foundation in history. By March 2016, it was common knowledge that 
the United States was deeply connected to the despotic regimes that had traumatized Latin 
America during the 1970s and 1960s.  
United States interference in Latin American affairs dates back to the nineteenth century 
when the Monroe Doctrine restricted European influence in the region. However, US 
involvement in Latin American governments spiked after the end of World War II. Socialist and 
populist leaders in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Venezuela, and other countries 
throughout the region gained power in a wave of anti-Western, anti-capitalist sentiment that 
threatened US hegemony. Some countries, like Cuba, aligned themselves with the USSR, while 
others, like Argentina and Chile, did not directly align themselves with Moscow, but still 
rejected US imperialism in the region. In an effort to contain the spread of communism, the 
United States pitted itself against these new leftist governments in a series of both overt and 
                                                 
1 Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora, Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos 
por Razones Políticas, H.I.J.O.S., and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS). Letter to Noah B. Mamet, 
March 11, 2016. Translated by the Author.  
  
2 
covert operations intended to undermine uncooperative regimes. Most of these actions were 
successful. Leftist governments were ousted by US backed military regimes, which imposed 
right wing, authoritarian rule that subjected their countries to horrific human rights abuses. 
Military dictators throughout Latin America, such as those of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 
worked together to form a covert operation, called Operation Condor, which allowed them to 
effectively pursue their victims across borders. Thousands of intellectuals, religious leaders, 
students, leftists, social workers, and members of other demographic groups were targeted and 
accused of being subversives, leftists, and communists.2 Many people who had been tortured and 
killed were never found, as bodies were disposed of in mass graves or thrown into the ocean. 
Thus, victims of the US-backed regimes came to be known as the disappeared.3  
Ultimately, these dictatorships were replaced by democratically elected governments. 
Domestic politics in Latin America since the end of the Cold War has been characterized by the 
complicated process of coming to terms with its violent past. This effort is made no easier by the 
fact that in most cases, the dictators exonerated themselves of all crimes and destroyed evidence 
of the violence of their regimes before leaving office.4 Despite, and in part because of, this 
adversity, human rights groups, family members of the victims of the regimes, and Latin 
American governments still struggle to collect enough information to prosecute perpetrators and 
make sense of their respective national tragedies.  
                                                 
2 Evidence that these demographics were targeted can be found in truth commissions reports such as Argentina’s 
report on el Processo, Nunca Mas. "Nunca Más" (Never Again) - Report of Conadep 
(National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons) - 1984). 
3 Ibid. 
4See, for example, Neil J. Kritz (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Alexandra de Brito (ed), The Politics of Memory: Transitional 
Justice in Democratizing Societies (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Jeffrey Davis, Justice across 
Borders: The Struggle for Human Rights in U.S. Courts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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Truth Commissions, public memorials, and personal testimonies dot the physical and 
literary landscape of Latin America. In 2005, Argentina’s amnesty laws that exonerated the 
military personnel who aided in the deaths and disappearances of over 30,000 people were ruled 
unconstitutional, allowing decades-old criminal cases to be re-opened. In November of 2017, 
fifty four military personnel were indicted for crimes committed during Argentina’s dictatorship, 
twenty nine of whom were eventually sentenced to life in prison.5 Likewise, in 2014, Brazil’s 
Truth Commission released a report of over 1,000 pages that detailed crimes committed during 
its military regime. The report marked the first formal documentation of the repression that 
lasted from 1964 to 1985.6 
Obtaining evidence of past crimes is crucial to every country that suffered from the 
dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s. Finding evidence means closure for families who lost 
loved ones; it means gaining the ability to bring perpetrators to justice, and it means allowing a 
country to reconcile with its dark past, so that history will not repeat itself. Yet for many years, 
and in some cases to this day, obtaining information about what happened during these 
dictatorships has been incredibly difficult. Many of the dictators launched widespread 
misinformation campaigns during their regimes, destroyed evidence of their crimes, and ensured 
institutional blocks to judicial repercussions before leaving office. In countries that have 
attempted reconciliation processes after a return to democracy, it has been difficult or impossible 
to pursue legal justice for decades following the end of the dictatorships.  
                                                 
5 Reuters Staff. "Argentine Court Sentences 29 to Life for Dictatorship Crimes." Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-rights/argentine-court-sentences-29-to-life-for-dictatorship-crimes-
idUSKBN1DU021.  
6 National Security Archive. "Brazil Truth Commission Releases Report." News release. December 10, 2014. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB496/.  
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For years, the United States has had the power to aid in these investigations. The country 
was so deeply involved in the dictatorships that thousands of pages of evidence on the crimes 
committed during the Latin American military dictatorships are available in CIA, Military, and 
Presidential archives. Numerous requests have been made by human rights groups, activists, 
historians, families, and governments through the Freedom of Information Act to declassify these 
documents. Many of these documents are more than twenty-five years old, which means they 
should automatically be reviewed for release under US transparency law. Through making these 
classified documents available, the United States has a unique opportunity to make amends for 
its involvement in Latin America and to live up to its self-crafted reputation of promoting global 
democracy and justice. Yet, declassification projects have been limited, drawn out, contentious, 
and deeply political.  
Why has the United States been so reluctant to aid the Latin Americans in the ongoing 
process of reconciling the difficult and painful history of the Cold War, especially at a time when 
the U.S. preaches transparency in governance at home and abroad; and what does the process of 
declassification of documents regarding American influence in Latin America during the Cold 
War reveal about U.S. declassification politics and U.S.-Latin American relations?  These are the 
core questions animating this study. 
I argue that the American resistance to assisting the nations of Latin America in coming 
to terms with their difficult and painful histories reflects the primacy of political concerns over 
ethical and legal issues when presidents consider major declassification projects. This behavior 
reflects a persistent trend in U.S. foreign policy of placing interests ahead of values.  US 
presidential administrations are aware that they hold tremendous political power in the 
information concerning Cold War-era Latin American dictatorships that exists in classified and 
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declassified documents in the United States. As this project demonstrates, a president will never 
offer information to Latin American countries solely for transparency’s sake- but will only 
declassify documents if it is clear that there will be tangible political gains from a 
declassification project. While declassification projects by predominantly Democratic 
administrations in the past twenty years have been applauded, both within Latin America and in 
the broader global community, the influence that the Clinton and Obama were able to wield in 
Latin America through their efforts of transparency reflects a long history of United States 
interference and intervention into politics in the region.7  
Before introducing my case studies, I will first review the technical legal complications 
of the declassification process. These nuances within United States declassification law could be 
deemed the intuitive view for why American political administrations have been so slow to 
respond to the demands by the Latin Americans for greater transparency about the role of the 
U.S. in Latin America during the Cold War.  The project then focuses on two case studies, in 
Chile and Argentina, to illustrate that the politicization of the declassification process has 
prevented more active U.S. participation in the process of reconciliation in Latin America. I 
further use these two cases to explore the term “declassified diplomacy.” Finally, after presenting 
my two case studies, I explore the broader implications of my arguments to the study of 
declassification politics and U.S. Latin American relations. 
The Conventional Wisdom 
                                                 
7Although this project focuses primarily on US facilitation of undemocratic regime change in Latin America, US 
intervention in the hemisphere has taken on many different forms, from trade deals, to land grabs, to drug wars. A 
vast array of literature exists concerning the history US intervention into Latin America, much of which is cited in 
this project. Additional broader works concerning US intervention in Latin America include: Ronning, C. Neale, and 
Lewis Hanke, eds. Intervention in Latin America. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf,, 1970. and; Martz, John D., ed. 
United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge. 2nd ed. Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. of Nebraska 
Pr., 1997. 
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If there is conventional wisdom for why the U.S. has been so reticent to assist Latin 
Americans in their reconciliation processes, it is the complications of the declassification politics 
within the United States. The country’s complex story of declassification legislation began in 
1966, when Lyndon B Johnson reluctantly signed The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) after 
months of congressional hearings concerning the need for a disclosure law. FOIA requires 
federal agencies to disclose any information requested, unless it falls under one of nine 
categories of exemption, “which protect interests such as personal privacy, national security, and 
law enforcement.”8 For decades, the act has remained a central component of US transparency 
law, and has been a critical resource for human rights groups and families of victims of Latin 
American authoritarian regimes as they seek information from the United States. However, 
FOIA falls short in a variety of ways. Most significantly, FOIA, was and remains, unable to 
reduce the tremendous backlog of classified information, namely because documents have to be 
specifically requested in order to be considered for declassification.  
It was not until 1995 that automatic declassification of government documents became 
legally mandated. President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12858, which established an 
automatic declassification program across all federal agencies, expediting the process of 
releasing thousands of executive branch documents dating back to World War II. The order 
mandated that all agency records and presidential library records predating 1975, and all 
classified records over 25 years old (with notable exceptions), be automatically declassified. This 
order, along with the Clinton Administration’s emphasis on timely transparency, had profound 
consequences on US declassification protocol and covert US operations in Latin America.  
                                                 
8 United Stated Department of Justice. “What is FOIA?” FOIA.gov. https://www.foia.gov/about.html. 
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However, while Executive Order 12858 set an important precedent of transparency, there 
were two significant flaws in the program which complicated the process of declassification and 
further frustrated Latin American governments, activists, and human rights organizations as they 
sought information from the United States. First, the Clinton administration met resistance from 
other federal agencies. The CIA, in particular, has a history of resisting aggressive 
declassification, and the agency took several years to initiate declassification programs, even 
after the order was signed.9 Second, the order listed categories of exemption for documents up 
for automatic declassification, some of which were subjective and broad, and thus open to 
interpretation. In many cases, these categories of exemption make it easy for federal bureaus to 
claim that a vast array of documents are not qualified for release.  
The Politics of Declassification: 
Rather than serving as the sole answer to why the United States is slow to release 
documents they are legally obliged to disclose, the contentious internal process of 
declassification in the United States underscores a central reality that will serve as the keystone 
of this project: While the President of the United States controls classified information, he must 
exercise tremendous political will to enforce a major declassification project. Thus, I argue that 
politics are the most powerful influences on secrecy and transparency. While a president has the 
power to declassify any information across all federal agencies, this power is difficult to enforce. 
Interagency tensions, nuances in legislation, and limited resources all influence the time it takes 
                                                 
9 A speech delivered by former CIA director Michael V. Hayden to the Society for Historians at the American 
Foreign Relations conference in June of 2007 provides insight into why the CIA tends to delay automatic releases of 
information. Hayden delineated three main difficulties that arise with the goal of classification: resource 
management, security of informants, and relationships with foreign partners. Ultimately, Hayden’s speech highlights 
logistical constraints to declassification that may be a legitimate source of CIA resistance to declassification. The 
speech can be found at: Hayden, Michael V. "Declassification: We Work for and Serve the Interests of the American 
People." Speech, Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Conference, Washington. DC, USA, June 
21, 2007.  
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for a document to be declassified. As shown in the case of Latin America, these checks to 
declassification can be crippling unless the president has enough political will to enforce a 
declassification effort.  
I seek to highlight a powerful, and underestimated, driving force behind whether a 
president will invest in transparency through enforcing declassification. Peter Kornbluh, senior 
analyst at the National Security Archive, coined the term “declassified diplomacy” when 
discussing both the Clinton and Obama administrations’ release of classified information as a 
means of repairing frayed relationships between the United States and its Latin American allies. 
According to Kornbluh, the Obama administration in particular declassified information as a sign 
of political good will, an olive branch as he attempted to rebuild a trust thoroughly eroded by 
decades of US involvement in undermining democracies and economies in the region. While 
declassification is a highly effective form of diplomacy, this project will also illustrate how even 
demonstrations of transparency and good will, such as Obama’s visit to Argentina and Clinton’s 
Chile Declassification Project can be a coercive means to strip agency away from Latin 
American countries, especially when these declassification projects are not accompanied by 
verbal accountability from US presidents.   
Latin America provides the ideal stage for an analysis of the way that declassification is 
wielded as a tool of statecraft by US presidents, first because the United States has exerted more 
covert influence on the continent than any other place on earth, and second, because the majority 
of US intrusion on Latin American sovereignty took place more than twenty-five years ago. This 
project focuses on US relations with Argentina and Chile to highlight presidents’ employment of 
declassification efforts at particular moments when they can be used as an effective diplomatic 
tool. 
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The case of Chile is used primarily as a means of illuminating why transparency takes 
special effort from a president, even when a system of automatic declassification review is in 
place. The Clinton administration’s declassification effort on documents concerning the coup in 
Chile also highlights factors that a president must consider when deciding how much to prioritize 
transparency. Yet I ultimately show that Clinton used his Chile Declassification Project as a 
diplomatic tool to ensure the United States’ collective legitimization in a global community that 
sought to establish a precedent against excusing dictators who committed crimes against 
humanity.  
The case study of Argentina references Obama’s effort to declassify information held 
about the Military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s as a means of repairing a frayed 
relationship between the United States and Argentina. Obama’s visit to Argentina in 2016 
marked the first bilateral visit between the two countries in nearly a decade. Anti-US sentiment 
in Argentina was strong, and the situation was made more volatile by the fact that the visit was 
planned on the anniversary of the coup that started the campaign of state terror. Obama arrived in 
Argentina with the promise of declassifying thousands of military documents, as well as 
documents from other federal bureaus. This olive branch was almost universally applauded and 
effectively reversed critical opinions of the visit. Obama’s promise of transparency, in 
combination with the election of Argentine President Mauricio Macri, was seen by the Obama 
administration as an opportunity to turn around decades of a fraught diplomatic relationship. 
Despite the compelling nature of declassification diplomacy, little to no academic 
literature exists examining its role in the declassification of information.10 I seek to contribute to 
                                                 
10 Archivists at the National Security Archive, such as Peter Kornbluh and Carlos Osorio, write extensively on 
“declassified diplomacy,” and much of their work is referenced in this project. However this term is most often 
employed in press releases or newspaper and magazine articles and is rarely referenced even in their own pieces in 
academic journals.  
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the existing literature by drawing from media pieces, historical texts, and declassified documents 
to prove that the utility of classified information as a tool of statecraft is a powerful determinant 
of whether a president will exercise enough political will to ensure that documents are 
declassified.  
Other forces, including international pressure, resource management, the potential for 
embarrassment, incriminating individuals, destroying legacies, or, in some cases, genuine 
concern that the information released will endanger people, are important to consider when 
analyzing the declassification process. It is almost impossible for these forces to not affect a 
president’s decision to expedite a declassification effort. However, I argue that these external 
factors support the importance of diplomacy as a determinant of political will. Outside forces, 
such as international scrutiny, are essential to the efficacy of declassification as a sufficiently 
powerful diplomatic playing card. Likewise, a president must be sure that transparency will 
provide a larger net benefit than loss to the United States reputation.  
The process of transparency that repaired the United States’ relationship with Argentina and 
Chile, twenty five years after their return to democracy, demonstrates the ways that political and 
social environments affect the utility of transparency in statecraft. While this project almost 
exclusively references events that happened in Latin America and Latin American/US relations, 
the lessons learned from this case study can provide insight into the role that classified 
information, or the promise of declassified information, plays in international human rights law, 
US domestic politics, and the role of the United States as a global actor.   
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Chile 
Bill Clinton’s Chile Declassification Project, like Obama’s declassification project in 
Argentina, illustrates that in order to pursue a massive declassification effort, the president needs 
to be convinced that the reputational gains of transparency outweigh other costs. The case of 
Chile differs from Argentina in key ways that illuminate the vast array of factors that go into 
declassification diplomacy. Clinton’s motivation to declassify documents was less rooted in a 
desire to restore a relationship with Chile than it was in an effort to restore the reputation of the 
United States in a Eurocentric global community. The Chile Declassification Project almost 
certainly would not have been implemented without European scrutiny. Another singular 
characteristic of the Chile Declassification Project is that US influence on Chilean politics in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s was so egregious that it eclipsed even other US interventions in Latin 
America. As the documents under question would soon reveal, the United States was the most 
influential actor in the orchestrating the events that lead to the bloody coup of 1973, and the 
seventeen year-long dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. The following section will draw 
primarily on declassified documents from the 1960s and 1970s, compiled and synthesized by 
Peter Kornbluh, to articulate US involvement in Chilean politics. The fallout from the 
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dictatorship, and the publicization of US involvement, expose powerful lessons about the 
efficacy and pitfalls of declassification diplomacy. 
 
“We can not endeavor to ignite the world if Chile itself is a placid lake”11  
The United States began to involve itself in Chilean politics in earnest in 1960, and 
continued to maintain an insidious and pivotal role in the fate of the country for the next decade. 
The secretive and delicate nature of US strategies in Chile were based in two historical 
precedents. First, The United Nations Charter of 1948 prevented overt intervention and 
demanded respect for national sovereignty, so the United States presidential administrations had 
long since learned to use the CIA to covertly influence the political climate of Latin America. By 
1960, the US had already launched covert operations to unseat the government of Jacobo Arbenz 
in Guatemala, and Fidel Castro in Cuba. US decisionmakers hoped to contain the spread of 
leftist, socialist, and communist thought in the region and maintain hegemonic power over the 
Western Hemisphere through undermining these regimes. However, the second historical 
precedent for thoughtful and subversive intervention in Chile was rooted in the embarrassing 
failure of other covert operations in the region. The Bay of Pigs incident in Cuba was both 
humiliating and counter-productive, and convinced the Kennedy administration that further 
intervention in Latin America needed to be more subtle. Skillful and undetectable intervention 
was essential in Chile because the country held a critical strategic role for the success of John F. 
Kennedy’s brainchild, the Alliance for Progress.12  
                                                 
11 CIA, Secret Cable from Headquarters [Blueprint for Fomenting a Coup Climate]. September 27, 1970 1-7. Cited 
in Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: New 
Press, 2003. 19. 
12 Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File. 3. 
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Kennedy initiated the Alliance for Progress in 1961. The program marked a change in US 
Latin America Policy; instead of supporting oligarchs, Kennedy shifted US support to centrist 
political parties by offering twenty billion dollars in aid for Latin American governments to 
restart their economies.13 Chile was the prototype of this new strategy. The Kennedy 
administration invested in Eduardo Frei, who led the centrist Partido Democrata-Cristiano 
(PDC). For Kennedy, and the next three presidential administrations after him, the PDC was the 
ideal blueprint for a “middle class revolution.”14 At first, the strategy worked. Frei won the 
elections in 1964, leading Lyndon B Johnson to declare Chile “a showcase for the Alliance for 
Progress.” In an effort to maintain the success of the PDC, Washington increased its foreign aid 
to Chile so that by 1970, Chile had received over 1.2 billion dollars in grants and loans from the 
US, making it the leading recipient of US foreign aid in Latin America.  
The massive investment of the US in Chile meant that election of Salvador Allende in 
September of 1970 symbolized a devastating failure of US projects in the region, as much as it 
symbolized a major victory for peaceful, democratic, socialist reform in the leftist global 
imagination. The US was infuriated by its own inefficacy. As Kissinger was heard telling one of 
his staff members after Allende’s election “we set the limits of diversity.” 15 Salvador Allende’s 
peaceful and democratic ascension to power had undermined those limits. 
 Allende had been on US radar as a threat since 1958, when his socialist coalition, titled 
Frente de Accion Popular (FRAP) lost only narrowly to the right wing Partido Nacional in the 
elections. Yet despite US awareness of Allende and investment in the PDC, Allende beat out the 
other two top candidates from the National Party and the People’s Democratic party with 36% of 
                                                 
13 Department of State, United States of America. “Alliance for Progress and Peace Corps, 1961–1969.” Office of 
the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/alliance-for-progress. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File. Xiii. 
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the vote in 1970. Allende’s win coincided with a major change in US presidential 
administrations. As far as Nixon and Kissinger were concerned, Kennedy-era expressions of soft 
power and aid-based intervention had failed. The focus in Washington shifted from 
diplomatically promoting centrist politics to covertly preventing the congressional ratification 
that was necessary for Allende to officially assume the presidency. The clandestine efforts 
launched by both the Nixon administration and the CIA came to be known as Project FUBELT, 
and marked the beginning of the most egregious stage of US infiltration into Chilean politics.  
Nixon and Kissinger decided that the most effective way to prevent an Allende 
presidency would be to orchestrate a military coup in Chile. The CIA proposed two different 
strategies for provoking a coup, so named Track I and Track II. Track I involved colluding with 
Eduardo Frei to fill his cabinet with members of the military, thereby placing Chile under 
effective military rule before Allende was able to assume the presidency. However Track I 
quickly became unfeasible. Frei proved to be unwilling to “betray Chile’s long standing tradition 
of civil, constitutional rule.”16  Unlike Nixon, Frei had resigned himself to the results of the 
election, and was committed to the preservation of Chilean democratic processes. Thus Track II, 
which involved an outright military coup without Frei’s cooperation, quickly became the only 
path forward. The plan would take place in three stages, as articulated by Peter Kornbluh:  
1. Identify, contact, and collect intelligence on coup-minded officers 
2. Inform them that the US was committed to “full support in coup” short of 
sending the marines 
3. Foster the creation of “a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and 
terrorist activities” to provide stimulus and pretext for a military to move.17 
 
Pursuing a coup in Chile would require a tremendous amount of effort, most significantly 
because the political climate in Chile was not remotely conducive to a coup. Frei was not the 
                                                 
16Ibid., 13. 
17 Ibid., 14. 
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only influential political actor who opposed an unconstitutional shift to military rule. René 
Schneider, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Military, also opposed unconstitutional regime 
change. Furthermore, the military, like its commander and chief, was “a-political,” 
“constitutional oriented,” and reluctant to involve itself in civilian politics. 18 Lastly, public 
interest in a coup was nonexistent. According to Kornbluh “the vast majority of Chileans were at 
peace with the outcome of their political process.”19 
 In order to implement a coup that nobody in Chile wanted but the US deemed necessary, 
the CIA isolated two distinct goals. “Neutralize” Schneider, and create a “coup climate,” or 
“heightening tensions” in Chile. The US used covert operations to quietly wage an economic, 
psychological, and political war against Chilean democracy. US businesses, the CIA, and the 
government exacted a variety of measures intended to, in the words of Nixon, “make the 
economy scream.”20 Meanwhile, the CIA carried out propaganda campaigns against Allende and 
planted rumors designed to escalate political polarization in the country. Concurrently, Nixon 
and the CIA supported a plan to kidnap Schneider, and blame the attack on leftist subversives, 
thus eliminating a vocal opponent of the coup while sowing discord among the left.  
The US shared this ambition with an ally in the Chilean military, General Roberto Viaux. 
The first kidnap attempt failed, and from that moment onward US involvement in direct attacks 
on Schneider becomes cloudy. On October 22, 1970, Schneider’s car was stopped in Santiago. 
He was shot, taken to the hospital in critical condition, and eventually died. While it is clear that 
the CIA and Nixon both were aware of a plan to kidnap Schneider, Nixon and the CIA’s direct 
involvement in the assassination is still contested. Declassified documents from that moment 
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suggest that there was some uncertainty within the CIA about who actually carried out the attack. 
Eventually, The United States blamed the assassination on an unauthorized initiative of right-
wing students who were led by Viaux, yet it seems as though Viaux assumed, reasonably, that he 
had US support, and possibly used weapons that were supplied by the United States.  
 Despite the efforts Project FULTBELT, the Chilean Congress ratified Salvador Allende 
as President on October 24th, 1970. Although the US had failed to prevent the inauguration, the 
assassination of René Schneider and the economic and political fallout from the operations of 
project FUBELT set into motion the destabilization and polarization of a political climate that, 
only a year previously, had been characterized as “a placid lake.”21 Nixon, Kissinger, and the 
CIA maintained their ambitions of orchestrating a coup in Chile, yet Allende’s inauguration 
raised the stakes of US operations. The Nixon administration knew that openly violating respect 
for “the outcome of democratic elections” would “reduce our credibility throughout the 
world….increase nationalism directed against us...be used by the Allende government to 
consolidate its position...and move the Allende government to seek even closer relations with the 
USSR.”22 The embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs would pale in comparison to the repercussions 
if the world got wind of US infiltration into Chilean political life.  
Thus, the United States continued to undermine Allende “from a low key posture,” 
feigning neutrality while continuing to quietly undermine economic, political, and psychological 
life in Chile. Nixon proposed that the United States dump copper holdings into the international 
market to undermine Chile’s newly nationalized copper mines, the White House worked with the 
World Bank to delay loans to Chile and prevent Allende from restructuring Chilean debt to the 
United States, and virtually all aid to Chile, with the notable exception of military aid, was cut 
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off. Meanwhile, The US government also continued to covertly fund the PDC, transforming it 
into a “pro coup force.”23 
 Covert operations lead by the CIA also increased. In fact, the CIA considered Allende a 
far easier target as a sitting president than as President Elect. In a special report titled “Allende 
after the Inauguration,” it was noted that the potential for a military coup was more likely in the 
post inaugural period as Allende dealt with “tremendous administrative and governmental 
problems brought on by a continued economic decline and by an increase in political infighting 
within his coalition.” 24 The El Mercurio Project marked a key example of blatant CIA 
infiltration into the political climate in Chile. El Mercurio was a prominent right wing Chilean 
Newspaper that the CIA had been funding since the 1960s. After the election, Nixon authorized 
$700,000 in funds to the newspaper, ensuring that it would continue to run stories that would 
exacerbate the destabilization of Allende’s regime.  
Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA were so careful to maintain a face of neutrality that the US 
Congress did not even know about covert operations in Chile. The operations remained 
successfully secret until March of 1972, when information was leaked that the International 
Telephone and Telegraph Company worked directly with the CIA to attempt to trigger a military 
coup. The revelation was met with outrage. The Washington Post released an editorial stating 
“How could it be...that in 1970 an American president could consider the possibility of acting to 
prevent the democratically elected president of a supposedly friendly country from taking 
office?”25 Former CIA director Richard Helms explicitly denied allegations that the CIA worked 
to overthrow the government in Chile when he was questioned by the Senate. The leak 
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crystallized the necessity for secrecy far more than it catalyzed a shift to transparency, and US 
covert intervention continued.  
While the United States was primarily responsible for the creation of a coup climate in 
Chile, the Allende government, the Unidad Popular (UP) was internally fragmented and ill 
equipped to cope with adversity that had been introduced by the United States. Unidad Popular 
consisted of a coalition of six parties, the Radical Party, the Socialist Party, MAPU, Izquierda 
Cristiana, Acción Popular Independiente, and the Partido Comunista Chileno (PCCh). Its 
platform was to “search for a replacement of the present economic structure, doing away with the 
power of foreign and national monopoly capital and of the latifundio in order to initiate the 
construction of socialism.”26 The UP government struggled with a rivalry between the Socialist 
party and the PCCh, and internal strife was exacerbated by the reality that the UP did not have a 
congressional majority. Antagonized by an opposition-led congress and international forces, the 
UP had the odds stacked against it from its inception.  
Despite overwhelming opposition, the UP’s plans to nationalize the economy and 
implement widespread income redistribution were successful for its first year of governance. 
Allende’s nationalization of the copper mines was widely applauded and supported by the 
political opposition, unemployment fell from 8.3% to 3.8%, GDP increased by 7.7% overall, and 
wages and salaries rose to 61.7% of income. However, even before Allende’s first year in office 
came to a close, political polarization within Chile continued to escalate and the economic 
situation began to crumble. Inflation spiked, copper prices fell, (due mainly to US intervention in 
the global market,) and government deficit rose to 22% of GDP by 1973.  
                                                 
26 Bethell, Leslie. Chile since Independence. New York City, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
  
19 
Unlike the military in Argentina, the Chilean military was hesitant to involve itself in 
politics. However several incidents lead the military to become alienated from the UP. The 
miliary resented Fidel Castro’s visit to Chile in 1971, and was alarmed by rumors that workers 
were beginning to be armed. As economic tensions spiked, political tensions worsened and “the 
political centre disappeared in Allende’s Chile.”27 The government's encouragement of workers 
to take over factories heightened animosity, and when the elections in March 1973 lead to 
ambiguous results, rumors of a coup became more pronounced. General Augusto Pinochet, who 
had been largely dismissed by the US as unlikely to support a coup, led the Chilean military in a 
coup in September of 1973. The violence of the coup matched the political temperature in Chile. 
At first, Allende refused to hand over the government, saying “The president elected by the 
people doesn't surrender.”28 But as the Army fought snipers in Santiago, Allende, hidden in the 
presidential palace of Modena, was abandoned by his military guards as they learned of their 
commander’s rebellion. The palace was bombarded with rocket attacks, and later that same 
afternoon, Salvador Allende killed himself.  
 
The Coup and the Pinochet Regime 
The coup in Chile carried several similar characteristics to the Coup in Argentina. It came 
in the wake of political polarization and economic instability, it was performed by a military that 
enjoyed significant political trust and credibility in the years leading up to the coup, and, once 
instated, the Junta lead by General Augusto Pinochet was determined to annihilate not only 
direct opposition, but all political parties, and all dissenting thought and opinion in defense of 
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“Western, Christian civilization.”29 Despite these similarities, the coup that took place in 1973 
looked vastly different from the coup in Argentina. While the coup in Argentina was relatively 
peaceful and the violence of the regime emerged after it had established a quasi-legitimate 
power, the coup in Chile was excessively bloody. In fact, the human rights abuses that earned the 
regime international notoriety were initiated during the coup itself.  
Immediately following the coup, congress was closed and the parties that had made up 
the UP were banned. A 6PM night time curfew was imposed, left wing periodicals disappeared, 
and virtually all governmental institutions were brought under military control. Although 
Pinochet presented himself initially as an institutionalist, he quickly abandoned all reference to 
the Constitution as his government sought to establish a permanent rule. In the days following 
the Coup, the CIA tallied death figures to be between 2,000 and 10,000, although the Junta 
government announced only 244 deaths. The violence did not abate in the months and years that 
followed. In the following seventeen years, 3,197 citizens would be killed and thousands more 
would be tortured at prison camps that opened around the country. Two sports arenas in Santiago 
were converted into detention centers. The bodies of those killed by the regime were buried in 
mass graves, thrown into the Mapocho River, dropped into the ocean, or simply dumped on city 
streets. 
The United States maintained scrupulous records of these human rights abuses, and kept 
up friendly relations with Pinochet as he moved to consolidate his personal power. In June of 
1974, Pinochet pressured the Junta to sign into law his status as “Supreme Chief of the Nation,” 
and by December he assumed his final title as “President of the Republic.” Pinochet established 
and closely oversaw a secret police agency called Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA,) 
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which carried out thousands of arrests and murders. 1,100 prisoners of detention camps were 
disappeared, much like their counterparts in Argentina, at the hands of DINA. For the majority of 
Pinochet’s rule, the US was careful not to endorse the violence in Chile. However, as noted by 
Kissinger in a staff meeting on October of 1973, “we should not support moves against them by 
seeming to disassociate ourselves from the Chileans. I think we should understand our policy-
that however unpleasant they act, this government is better for us than Allende was.”30 Unlike 
Allende, Pinochet’s financial policies were deferential to the United States, while his ideological 
policies staunchly marginalized the leftist voice in Chile. The US initiated a debt restructuring 
program, continued to arm the military, and granted 24 million dollars through the US 
department of agriculture in commodity credits to alleviate food shortages. The CIA continued to 
fund El Mercurio, which ran pro-military propaganda.  
The event that marked the turning point in US-Chilean relations, and in US support for 
the regime, took place on September 21, 1976, when a car bomb exploded in downtown 
Washington DC, killing former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his colleague, Ronni 
Moffitt. Until September 11, 2001, this assassination was the most significant act of international 
terrorism ever committed in the US capital. The Moffitt and Letelier assassination corresponded 
with the election of President Jimmy Carter, who criticized President Gerald Ford for “helping to 
establish a military dictatorship” during his campaign. Although Reagan later tried to reverse 
Carter’s stance against Pinochet, the terrorist attack prevented any real reconciliation between 
the two countries. Congress proposed spending cuts to Chile, and the terrorist attack, combined 
with increasing international pressure to condemn the human rights abuses in Chile, forced 
Reagan to continue to distance himself from Pinochet.  Finally, the murder of a nineteen year old 
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American citizen, Rodrigo Rojas, a young activist and photographer who came to Chile to 
document human rights abuses, drove the final wedge between the US and the Pinochet regime.  
Meanwhile, the Junta’s free market policies lead to a recession in Chile, which reignited 
political opposition, not just from leftists, but from elites who sustained losses due to the 
recession. The US once again began discussing supporting a centrist political party in Chile, and 
mounting external and internal pressure forced Pinochet to hold elections. Although the Junta 
attempted to quell the overwhelming opposition, ultimately Pinochet was forced to step down in 
March of 1981. However, like many other dictators throughout Latin America, he ensured his 
total immunity before leaving office. Pinochet's initial evasion of justice would give the US a 
rare opportunity to make up for its involvement years later.  
 
 
Legacies of Scandal 
Repercussions from the US involvement in Chile began to take shape even before 
Pinochet left office. In July of 1975, CIA director William Colby testified in a closed session 
before a special senate panel that the CIA had not condoned the assassination of General René 
Schneider, but been involved in orchestrating the Coup. The testimony was leaked to the New 
York Times, and on September 8th, 1974, the newspaper published a front page story titled “CIA 
Chief tells House of 8 Million Campaign against Allende in 70-73.” 31 The report detailed 
Colby’s testimony and referenced Nixon’s claim the previous year that the CIA had nothing to 
do with the coup.32  
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  While Colby’s admissions were only partial, they lead to immediate uproar because they 
proved that Nixon, Kissinger, and other government officials had lied to Congress. The fallout 
from this scandal is essential to an analysis of declassification in foreign policy. The New York 
Times report forced the United States to reconcile with major aspects of its mechanisms of 
foreign policy. First, the words of Kornbluh, “CIA intervention became subject to public 
debate...a debate that would endure and influence US operations in countries from Angola to 
Nicaragua to Iraq in the last quarter of the twentieth century.”33 In addition to CIA involvement, 
the case of Chile marked a “the first major fight between the executive branch and Congress over 
human rights and US foreign policy.”34 The debates in Washington mobilized a human rights 
based political movement within a country that was fresh from its fury at the Vietnam War. The 
US Citizenry was fed up with government intervention in distant countries, and Congress was 
compelled to pass unprecedented human rights legislation as a result. The legislation included 
the “Harkin Amendment” which bound US economic assistance to the human rights record of 
other governments. Additionally, Congress put a 25 million dollar cap on aid to Chile until 
Pinochet turned around his human rights abuses.35  
While this legislation was unprecedented, it was completely ignored by the executive 
branch. President Gerald Ford’s ability to ignore the newly drafted legislation, and the ability of 
successive presidential administrations to drastically affect the fate of another country without 
the knowledge or consent of Congress, much less the American public, demonstrates the power 
of the executive branch in matters of foreign policy and transparency. This power is the central 
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reason why declassification can and should be analyzed through the lens of presidential 
administrations.  
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that, years later, when the Clinton Administration 
initiated the Chile Declassification project, it was already widely known that the US had 
participated in the coup. Potential embarrassment was less of a consideration than further 
incrimination of individuals like Kissinger. Ultimately, the scandal defined Chile as a key case 
study in government transparency since the 1960s.  
 
Information and Justice 
The Chile Declassification Project exemplifies the forces that both hinder and expedite 
declassification of documents about military dictatorships in Latin America. As the following 
sections will illustrate, Clinton’s decision to launch the project was based in his belief that the 
United States’ self-proclaimed international reputation for promoting democracy, human rights, 
and justice would suffer far more if he withheld information about US covert actions in Chile 
than if he was transparent about his country’s insidious past. The story of the Chile 
Declassification Project and of Pinochet’s arrest in London highlight that FOIA, and Executive 
Order 12658, which imposed the twenty five year limit on classified documents, do not 
necessarily ensure timely freedom of information.  Additionally, this story illustrates that a 
president must have significant political incentive to expedite a declassification process. The 
Project also highlights considerable pitfalls of declassifying documents concerning US 
involvement in Latin America. Although, ultimately, Clinton had no other option than to initiate 
the project, the scandal that followed exemplifies that transparency can have serious negative 
consequences. Clinton initiated the project under intense international scrutiny, and his insistence 
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that the project be carried out illustrates the power of transparency and declassification in 
collective legitimization within the global community.  
Pinochet’s dictatorship lasted for seventeen years, which means that many of the 
documents concerning the dictator’s rule were not qualified for release under the twenty five 
year mark. Nevertheless, the coup that brought Pinochet to power predated the 1975 deadline 
delineated by Executive Order 12958. Yet in the twenty five year period after the coup, very few 
secret documents concerning the dictatorship were released, and many of the documents that 
were declassified were so heavily censored that only their titles were made available, rendering 
them almost useless for both judicial and historical analysis. The global need for more 
information grew, however, when Pinochet was detained in London in 1998. 
Pinochet initially enjoyed immunity from the crimes that he committed while in power. 
Like many other Latin American dictators, Pinochet “created for himself, and most of his 
accomplices, a legal structure of absolute impunity”36 that he thought would protect him from 
criminal investigation once he left office. Pinochet continued to maintain his position as 
commander and chief of the military, and named himself senator for life, which guaranteed him 
parliamentary immunity. Additionally, Pinochet enacted an amnesty law for crimes committed 
during the 1973 coup while he was in power in the 1980s.37  
 Nevertheless, in 1996, Spanish lawyer and former Allende aid Joan Garcés initiated an 
effort to hold Pinochet and his government accountable for the crimes committed during and 
after the coup. In 1997, Garcés came to Washington DC to request classified documents through 
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the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT.) The treaty enables information sharing on criminal 
investigations between signatory governments, but the US was extremely unhelpful. Garcés was 
granted a few newspaper clippings, none of which contained information that could be put to use 
in a trial.  
Garcés’ case finally started to gain momentum when Spanish magistrate Carlos 
Castresana expanded Spanish law to include human rights crimes committed outside Spain, 
allowing Garcés to broaden his investigation to include Chilean as well as Spanish victims of the 
Pinochet regime. Finally, Garcés was able to convince a Spanish judge to issue a detention 
request through Interpol when Pinochet arrived in London in 1998. Upon his arrest in London, 
Pinochet claimed immunity, stating that heads of states could not be arrested and extradited. 
However, the House of Lords held that international crimes, including torture, were none 
‘functions’ of a head of state and that, given that Chile had ratified the UN Convention against 
torture, Pinochet had broken international law.  
Pinochet’s detention marked the first time that a former head of state was detained 
outside his home country for extradition to a third country. In the words of a Guardian article 
from 2000, “A precedent has been set that no putative dictator can ignore. If you shoot, kidnap 
and torture your own people...you cannot escape prosecution. The Chileans should be 
congratulated. They have struck a blow for persecuted people everywhere - past, present and 
future.”38  Another Guardian article from 2000 exclaimed, “The judgment, probably the most 
momentous Britain's highest court has ever delivered, now stands as a key precedent in 
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international law throughout the world.”39 Human rights activists were thrilled, and former allies 
of Pinochet, like Margaret Thatcher and Henry Kissinger, were disgusted.40 
The international nature of Pinochet’s case was a major indicator of why Clinton chose to 
launch the Chile Declassification Project. England, Spain, and Chile were directly involved in 
Pinochet’s arrest, and the rest of Europe watched the process carefully. According to a Guardian 
article from 1998, “France, Switzerland and Belgium...joined Spain in seeking General 
Pinochet’s extradition for crimes committed against their citizens.”41 It seemed as though the 
majority of activists and governments were eager to aid in the process of Justice. Human Rights 
Watch referred to Pinochet's arrest as a “wake up call to tyrants everywhere” and stated that  “an 
equally important effect of the case has been to give hope to other victims that they can bring 
their tormentors to justice abroad.”42 Support for Pinochet’s arrest set an important precedent of 
universal jurisdiction for human rights and torture related crimes which, fittingly, would come to 
be known as “The Pinochet Precedent.” The Pinochet Precedent would go on to play an integral 
role in international prosecution of dictators worldwide, including in the prosecution of Hissene 
Habre, former dictator of Chad, who came to be known as an “African Pinochet” when Senegal 
successfully tried him for human rights crimes in 2000.43  
With Pinochet detained in London, scrutiny of governments and human rights groups 
alike turned to the United States. In the immediate aftermath of the arrest, the Clinton 
administration was careful not to take a stance on the case, claiming that to do so would be 
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“inappropriate.”44 Perhaps more insidiously, rumors that the United States had quietly attempted 
to dissuade Britain from extraditing Pinochet to Spain were aired in major Newspapers.45 Yet the 
global community, particularly human rights organizations, demanded US support for the case. 
On October 22, 1998, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, wrote an open 
letter to Bill Clinton, urging him to “help promote judicial accountability for crimes committed 
during the military rule of Augusto Pinochet.”46  
In his open letter, Roth pointed out the hypocrisy that remains rooted in United States 
hesitancy to aid in investigations in Latin America; he referenced the United States’ active 
involvement earlier in the year in attempting to bring Cambodian Dictator Pol Pot to trial in 
Canada: “The U.S.'s muted position on the need to bring Pinochet to justice contrasts with its 
active attempts earlier this year to seek to bring Pol Pot to trial in Canada...The U.S. should be at 
least as supportive of Spain's assertion of jurisdiction over Pinochet as it was of attempts to try 
Pol Pot in Canada.”47  Roth was clear about the enormous weight of the Pinochet case, saying 
“Future tyrants must understand that punishment awaits those who commit crimes against 
humanity, internationally if not domestically.”48 Roth also referenced the three US citizens that 
were killed in Chile by the regime, and the car bombing that killed Letelier and Moffitt in 
Washington DC as further reason why the US had a responsibility to aid in the investigation. 
Roth criticized the United States for its lack of transparency, saying “We are concerned...by 
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reports that the U.S. has been stingy in its cooperation with requests made by Spanish law 
enforcement authorities acting under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the U.S. and 
Spain.” Lastly, Roth’s letter suggests that engagement in the Pinochet case could repair the 
United States’ damaged reputation in international human rights. The summer previously, the 
United States had joined seven other nations to vote against an international criminal court to 
investigate and prosecute cases of Genocide. In the words of Roth, “Washington has to get back 
on the right side of issues of international Justice.”49  
 
The Chile Declassification Project 
Roth’s argument, that the United States had an obligation to involve itself, for the justice 
of its own murdered citizens, to redeem its shoddy human rights record, and to back up its self-
proclaimed active involvement in bringing other dictators to justice, were all major 
considerations of the Clinton administration as it launched the Chile Declassification Project. Yet 
before ultimately deciding that “the benefits of openness in human rights cases outweighed the 
risks to national security in this case,”50  Clinton was forced to consider the many possible 
pitfalls of backing up his administration’s reputation for transparency. 
The Pinochet Precedent was hailed by human rights activists around the world as a major 
step forward for justice. It also was the main reason why Clinton was hesitant to support 
Pinochet’s detention. Peter Kornbluh described the Pinochet Precedent in relation to the United 
States, calling it “the globalization of justice on human rights and war crimes that carried 
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implications for current and future US leaders.”51  In other words, the Pinochet Precedent 
established that other countries were responsible for prosecuting violators of international human 
rights law. This was a risky precedent for the United States to buy into. A 1998 article in the New 
York Times articulates one reason why: 
Senior United States officials, speaking on the condition that they would not 
be quoted directly or by name, said they had deep concerns about the idea that 
a Spanish judge could reach across borders and try a former foreign leader. 
They said the United States had opposed the idea of a permanent international 
tribunal for crimes against humanity for the same reasons that officials are 
queasy about the Pinochet case. They said they feared that foreign judges 
might accuse United States officials in the deaths of citizens in nations where 
American policy had violent consequences.52 
 
Additionally, future US leaders could be criticized for not holding other violators accountable. 
Thus, the Pinochet Precedent serves as an example of why analysis of the role that the US can 
play in prosecution of Latin American dictators has important implications to global human 
rights law enforcement. 
 Although at first the Clinton administration was reluctant to aid in the effort, and the CIA 
was even more vocal about its resistance to the project, Clinton launched the Chile 
Declassification Project in 1999. Clinton’s investment in the project demonstrates the power of 
collective legitimization in international politics. By releasing the documents, Clinton ran the 
risk of “opening a can of worms,”53 yet the international nature of the case, the fact that Pinochet 
was detained in Europe, and the need for the United States to make up for its inconsistent human 
rights record, meant that to not declassify the documents would be far worse for the Clinton 
administration. Furthermore, by aiding in the investigation early on, Clinton hoped to ensure that 
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the case was not heard in an international criminal court: “The declassification allows the US to 
help Mr. Garzon and makes it less likely that an international court will be established to judge 
the issue.”54 Establishing an international court meant that the United States and its allies who 
did not prioritize human rights could be held accountable in inconvenient ways. Thus, Clinton 
was forced to tread “into a political and diplomatic confrontation it tried to avoid”55 and launch 
the Declassification Project.  
 The stated goal of the project was to “make public as much information as possible” and 
to “assist in encouraging a consensus within Chile on reinvigorating its truth and reconciliation 
process to address such questions as the fate of the disappeared.” Additionally, the project was 
intended to “respond to the expressed wishes of the families of American victims of human 
rights abuse, and to the requests of numerous members of congress.” 56 Ultimately, Clinton 
ensured the release of 23,000 documents, including 2,000 CIA operational and analytical 
records, 3,800 White House, NSC, Pentagon and FBI records, and 16,000 State Department 
documents. Despite the wealth of information, the documents did not ensure Pinochet’s 
incarceration.57  
In 2000, Pinochet was released and sent back to Chile when medical tests revealed that he 
did not have the mental capacity to stand trial. Nevertheless, the documents released by the Chile 
Declassification Project shed important light on a dark period of Chilean history, brought 
dignity, information, and closure to victims of the regime, and aided in establishing a precedent 
that would be utilized in international human rights cases worldwide. Likewise, Clinton’s 
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participation in the project gave the United States a, perhaps undeserved, leadership role in the 
promotion of global human rights.  
 
Problems with the Process- Nuances of Declassification 
The difficulties that the Clinton Administration faced when implementing the Chile 
Declassification Project are a clear manifestation of the deceptive complexity of declassification. 
First, the CIA took issue with the declassification of operational records on covert actions in 
Chile. CIA lawyers fought to ensure a caveat to the NSC directive that tasked the declassification 
project. They wanted to add that agencies “should retrieve and review all documents that are 
subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.”58 This sentence would prevent the 
CIA from being forced to search essential operational files. The CIA’s resistance to the project 
eventually became clear to the public and was met with outrage. In the words of Kornbluh, “The 
agency’s recalcitrant attitude toward the project threatened to transform a precedent-setting 
exercise in openness into another classic CIA cover-up.”59 The director of the National Security 
Archive wrote to the White House, saying “The failure to release these records will be 
immediately viewed, nationally and internationally, as a cover-up of the past and an effort by 
Washington to shield itself from any historical accountability for events in Chile in the early 
1970s.”60 Blanton’s statement alludes to the wider public perception that resistance to 
declassification reflects a desire to avoid accountability.  
The battle between the public, the White House, and the CIA continued until November 
13th, 2000, when the final set of records, containing over one thousand formerly top secret CIA 
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cables, meeting minutes, reports, budget proposals, and memoranda on covert operations in Chile 
was released. The tension between the White House and the CIA, as well as CIA director of 
operations James Pavitt’s ability to directly contradict presidential orders, has important 
implications. Although executive powers allow the president total authority in the 
declassification of information across federal agencies, enforcing that authority remains 
complicated and requires time and resources that a president may choose to employ elsewhere.   
The Chile Declassification Project was applauded throughout Europe and Latin America, 
and ultimately was essential in the US maintaining a positive international reputation while the 
Pinochet case was in the international spotlight. However, the fallout from the release of 
documents concerning US covert action in Chile displays that the concerns of CIA and other 
government agencies were not unfounded. The documents incriminated Henry Kissinger as a 
“Chief architect of US policy towards Chile.”61 They also revealed that Kissinger had extensive 
knowledge of Operation Condor and resisted pressuring leaders in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay 
to halt acts of international terrorism and political assassination. This exposure meant that, in the 
words of Kornbluh, “More than any other official, Kissinger would bear the burden of the 
unresolved and ongoing controversies relating to the coup and the aftermath.”62 Ironically, (and 
appropriately,) Kissinger became the first US official to be “Penocheyed,” or threatened with 
legal proceedings in multiple countries. The sons of General René Schneider used declassified 
US documents to file a wrongful death lawsuit against Kissinger and Former CIA director 
Richard Helms. 
In response to this fallout, the State Department recommended that the Clinton 
administration issue a formal apology. However, White House officials avoided official 
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acknowledgement of US responsibility for the Coup. Instead, the White House released the 
following statement:  
One goal of the project is to put original documents before the public so that it 
may judge for itself the extent to which US actions undercut the cause of 
democracy and human rights in Chile. Actions approved by the US 
government aggravated political polarization and affected Chile’s long 
tradition of democratic elections and respect for constitutional order and the 
rule of law.63  
 
Kornbluh criticized this “contorted press statement,” claiming that it “fell far short of 
acknowledging the contribution that US foreign policy had made to the national and human 
horror experienced in Chile- an acknowledgement needed for Chileans to gain closure on a 
painful history.” Kornbluh’s issue with the White House press statement highlights a wider 
question of US accountability. In cases where the US actively aides in undermining democracy, 
is transparency strong enough to heal diplomatic relations? Or is a more explicit admission of 
accountability necessary to alleviate the anti-US sentiment that is still fervently expressed 
throughout Latin America? 
Regardless, the negative consequences of the Project demonstrate clearly that 
transparency can never be lightly offered by presidential administrations. Clinton was fully 
aware that the evidence of the documents would incriminate Kissinger and Nixon, and place the 
United States under an embarrassing microscope. He chose to release those documents anyway, 
because he knew that a much more relevant and enduring international reputation was at stake. 
The Pinochet case constituted a major turning point in the way that the world views human rights 
cases. Clinton’s declassification project was rooted in his desire to be on the right side of history. 
Former reluctance to release documents about the dictatorship, and Garcés’ initial failure to find 
information when he first looked to the US for assistance, proves that the Declassification 
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Project would not have been carried out without international scrutiny. Clinton recognized the 
necessity for transparency as the most effective tool available to avoid international 
condemnation, even when the documents would reveal that the United States was involved in 
Pinochet’s success. Thus, the Chile Declassification Project demonstrates the way that 
transparency is only employed when absolutely necessary, and when a President believes that he 
has something to gain through his effort.  
The necessity of the project does not mean that Clinton’s motives do not deserve 
scrutiny. In addition to being a precedent-setting example of declassification diplomacy, the 
Pinochet case and the Chile Declassification Project demonstrate the way that institutional, 
bureaucratic, and imperialist forces strip away the agency of Chilean people in their 
reconciliation of their own national tragedy. Institutional and bureaucratic forces within Chile 
made it impossible for Pinochet to be brought to justice in his own country. Thus, Spain, 
England, and the United States took on an active role in the judicial process and subsequently the 
reconciliation process for Chile. Clinton assumed his leadership role in promoting global human 
rights without acknowledging that the United States had undermined a previously healthy 
Chilean democracy, and supported a dictator who enacted laws that preemptively halted any 
Judicial investigations. Likewise, Britain was able to maintain a face of humanitarianism, 
without acknowledging that it had been a longtime ally of the Pinochet government. The ability 
of Britain and the United States to dictate process of Justice for Chile is heavy with irony and 
hypocrisy, that was not missed by Chileans, or other witnesses in Latin America. The Guardian 
cited Argentine Newspaper La Nación, as it spoke of British Home Secretary Jack Straw’s 
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decision to let Pinochet go. “Straw’s decision, whether or not Pinochet now returns, ruffles the 
sheets of bygone phantoms. It’s the past returning.” 64 
Meanwhile, Chilean activists used the power of international attention to their advantage, 
reclaiming their role in the story. The Guardian quoted Chilean Newspaper La Tercera, saying 
“Augusto Pinochet will walk directly onto the judicial stage when he returns to Chile.”65 Another 
article from October of 1999 states “The fact that Gen Pinochet was arrested abroad has forced 
Chileans to admit how far they have to go to wrest their democratic tradition away from the grip 
of the Chilean military.”66 In the words of a Chilean photojournalist, “The curtain has opened on 
Chilean society. There is now a movement of identification, Chileans are searching for what their 
history meant.”67 The international condemnation of Pinochet meant that in Chile, “newspapers 
and television news programmes lost their timidity.” Perhaps Britain did not fulfill its duty of 
bringing Pinochet to justice. Yet the silver lining is that, once the documents from the United 
States were shared, autonomy over justice, democracy building, and reconciliation was placed 
back into Chilean hands. Although Pinochet was never tried, the precedent that his arrest set was 
still seen as a victory in Chile and around the world. 
Argentina 
The following section will use the case study of Argentina to illustrate how 
declassification is used as a tool of diplomacy. Barack Obama’s visit to Argentina in 2016 was 
colored by nearly a century of fraught diplomacy, and yet the rocky history between the two 
countries had become all the more volatile in the aftermath of La Guerra Sucia, or the Dirty 
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War68- a period of military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983. Although the Junta that was in 
charge of the government during the Dirty War undermined democracy and committed horrific 
human rights crimes, the United States enjoyed a close diplomatic relationship with the country 
during this time period- capitalizing on the regime’s anti-communist, pro-Western, pro-capitalist 
policies. As Argentina reinstated a democratically elected government and began the recovery 
process, the United States was further regarded as a greedy antagonist that was complicit in 
Argentina’s national tragedy. This section will provide historical context for the Dirty War and a 
brief summary of US-Argentine relations, before illustrating that secrecy played an intimate role 
in both the fracturing and the mending of the relationship between Argentina and the United 
States. 
 
 
 
United States-Argentina Relations Leading up to the Coup 
While Argentina has both passively and actively resisted US influence almost since its 
inception, the history of the relationship between the two countries is essential to the legacy of 
the Dirty War. Furthermore, historical context of US-Argentine relations supports the analysis 
that declassification diplomacy is both an effective tool and difficult to use successfully. The 
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diplomatic relationship between Argentina and the United States dates back to 1823, when the 
US granted diplomatic recognition to Argentina. At first, the relationship between the two 
countries was expected to be profitable; Argentina was one of the first democracies established 
in Latin America and was rich in natural resources. Yet Argentina modeled itself after European 
countries economically, culturally, and demographically. Additionally, Argentina supported a 
massive influx of European migrants from Italy, Spain, and Germany, from the middle of the 
19th century through the end of World War I, and thus developed an identity as a “European 
Society in Exile.” By 1914, nearly one third of Argentina's population of 8 million was foreign 
born, and US hopes that Argentina would act as a counterbalance to European influence in the 
region had long since been dashed.69  In fact, Argentina’s stable democracy and healthy economy 
made the country a significant threat to US imperialist ambitions in Latin America. Argentina 
openly opposed the Monroe Doctrine, an American policy that obstructed European colonialism 
in Latin America, and interpreted Woodrow Wilson's attempt to encourage pan-Americanism as 
a ploy to gain economic power over the region.  
The already tense relationship between the two countries was further strained during 
World War II. The US broke diplomatic relations with Argentina in response to the country’s 
neutrality in the War and Juan Perón’s early admiration for Hitler and Mussolini. US Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull referred to the government of Buenos Aires as a “pro-Axis, fascist clique,” 
an impression that was exacerbated after the War, when Argentina became a refuge for Nazis 
like Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele as they fled prosecution. After tentatively being 
admitted to the United Nations, Argentina expressed open disdain for US foreign policy during 
the Cold War and refused to support the US-lead trade embargo on grain against the Soviet 
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Union. Argentina benefited significantly from their refusal, as they became a leading trade 
partner with the Soviets. Argentine exports expanded fourfold after 1980, and the Soviets had 
developed a 50-1 trade deficit with Argentina by the end of the Cold War. The United States 
continued to guess wrong in its assumptions about the internal affairs of Argentina when it 
tacitly supported the Military Dictatorship of the late 1970’s and Early 1980’s.  
 
State Terror  
Argentina’s military dictatorship was perhaps the most catastrophic of all the 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America during latter half of the twentieth century. In 1976, the 
military staged a coup that ousted the Peronist government and instated a succession of four 
Junta that would rule until 1983. For eight years, the Junta launched a campaign of terror against 
the Argentine population in an effort to weed out leftist, subversive thought from the country’s 
landscape. This period of violence came to be known as La Guerra Sucia, or the Dirty War, and 
resulted in the deaths of 30,000 individuals, as well as a collective national trauma that Argentina 
struggles to understand and recover from to this day. 
The Junta’s justification for state terror was rooted in a leftist guerrilla movement that 
began in 1955, when populist president Juan Perón was forced out of office by the Argentine 
military. Perón’s supporters, now stripped of political representation and a legal outlet for their 
demands, committed themselves to armed resistance as a means of exerting political influence. 
The guerillas took inspiration from Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution, as well as Che 
Guevara as he attempted to export his revolutionary models to the rest of Latin America.70 The 
Montoneros, the Movimiento Revolucionario Peronista, and the Ejército Revolucionario del 
                                                 
70Lewis, Daniel K. The History of Argentina. October 2003 ed. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. 122-138 
  
40 
Pueblo (ERP) became the largest and most notorious guerilla groups of the 1960s and 1970s, yet 
even at the height of their influence, these groups consisted of no more than 2000 individuals, of 
which only 400 had access to arms.71 Perón encouraged this form of leftist activism while in 
exile, however as the political violence in Argentina continued to escalate, Perón publicly 
condemned the guerilla movement and the main guerilla organizations broke ties with the 
Peronists.  
 Perón briefly regained office in 1973, but died in 1974, leaving his wife and vice 
president, Isabel Perón, in charge of a volatile political climate. Isabel turned out to be a 
thoroughly incompetent politician. Her attempts to follow conflicting advice from different 
factions within her government lead to confusing and inconsistent policy decisions that plunged 
Argentina into economic crisis. By 1975, inflation was mounting by thirty percent every month, 
earnings from exports were depressed by twenty five percent, and the country was buried in a 
one billion dollar deficit.72 As the economic situation in Argentina deteriorated, the influence of 
the guerillas peaked. In an attempt to salvage credibility, the government labeled the guerrillas as 
terrorists in 1975, and authorized a campaign of counter terror.73 Isabel’s government established 
the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, or the AAA, which kidnapped or assassinated leftist 
militants. These counterterror operations were met with increased resistance from the guerillas, 
as the ERP attempted to establish a revolutionary state in Tucuman, and The Montoneros 
initiated operations against government and military sites. Both groups increased kidnappings 
and used the ransoms to support their military and political campaigns. The AAA responded with 
even more repression and violence while the government attempted to make Peronism the sole 
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political force in the country. Isabel’s government became a “hard right, authoritarian regime,” 
and finally, by the end of 1975, the AAA was able to neutralize the guerilla threat.74 
Nevertheless, a crumbling economy and massive political polarization kept Argentina in a state 
of chaos. The military already had a legacy of political intervention in Argentina, and thus the 
coup in 1976 was not only expected, but welcomed.  
In addition to the initial support of the Argentinian public, the coup was also applauded in 
the United States. The US was supportive of the dictatorship in part because the Junta’s policies 
catered to US interests, and in part because the Junta’s rhetoric about the West was vastly 
different from that of its Peronist predecessors. Perón had been explicit in his disdain for the 
United States and had used anti-Western rhetoric as a tool for winning support, but the Junta, like 
other Authoritarian regimes in Latin America, were fiercely anti-communist and pro-Western. 
Thus, in the interest of exerting power and influence over the region, the US turned a blind eye to 
the abysmal human rights record of the new regime.75 The Junta in Argentina became just one of 
the repressive dictatorships that the United States supported in Latin America, in an attempt to 
maintain hegemony and contain the spread of communism.  
The Military took power easily and named General Rafael Videla its de-facto president. 
Even before taking office, Videla explicitly alluded to the Junta’s campaign against subversion. 
In a speech that supported the AAA and referenced his own plans to enter politics, Videla said 
“As many people as necessary must die in Argentina so that the country will again be secure.”76 
However, by the time the Junta took control, the guerilla threat had been all but eradicated by the 
AAA. Without a clear military threat to the regime, the Junta shifted its target from the guerillas 
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to all dissenting social and political thought. They framed their rule in Argentina as a precursor 
to a World War III, which would re-establish “Christian Civilization” and wipe subversive 
influence from the earth. Argentina’s best educated generation was all but annihilated during the 
Dirty War, as union and student activists, leaders of community aid groups, social workers, 
teachers, and other members of the intellectual class were targeted.  
Three hundred and forty secret death camps were erected throughout the country as 
suspected enemies of the state were kidnapped, tortured, and eventually executed. Most victims 
of the regime vanished without a trace. Victims were often shot and buried in mass graves, or 
drugged and thrown, naked and unconscious, out of planes into the Río de la Plata. Many 
prisoners were young parents and pregnant mothers. Children of the accused were stolen from 
their parents and adopted by military families or other families that supported the regime. Many 
of these children to this day do not know their true identity, and activist groups in Argentina are 
still conducting investigations that aim to find children of the disappeared and reunite them with 
their original families. The government often denied that the victims had ever been prisoners 
when their families came looking for them, instead claiming that their prisoners had fled the 
country and were abroad. This assertion was ironic, given that many people who did manage to 
escape Argentina were tracked down anyway; Operation Condor allowed the Junta to pursue 
fleeing activists across Argentina’s borders. Ultimately, the Junta wiped 30,000 people from the 
face of the earth, erasing their identities through torture and denial, and thus victims of the 
regime came to be known as “los desaparecidos,” or the disappeared.77   
While the US did not actively participate in the coup in Argentina as it had in Chile and 
other countries in the region, it still played an influential role in the Dirty War. Reagan honored 
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Videla with an official visit to the White House in 1980, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
actively encouraged the Junta to take whatever means were necessary to crackdown on 
subversives. In a memorandum of a conversation between Henry Kissinger and Argentine 
Admiral Guzzetti in Santiago in 1976, Kissinger said to Guzzetti, “If there are things that have to 
be done, you should do them quickly. But then you should get back quickly to normal 
procedures.” Later in that same conversation, Kissinger stated “We are aware you are in a 
difficult period. It is a curious time, when political, criminal and terrorist activities tend to merge 
without any clear separation. We understand you must establish authority.”78 Even as the 
violence of the Junta became more expansive and explicit, the US continued to passively support 
the regime by maintaining positive trade relations with Argentina.  This brief reconciliation 
between the two countries would serve to further the gap in their relationship after Argentina 
restored democratic rule.  
In addition to Kissinger’s verbal legitimization of the regime’s human rights abuses, The 
United States aided the Junta in honing its tools of oppression. The School of the Americas, a 
prestigious military training institution located in Fort Benning, Georgia, was the site of more 
insidious US involvement in Argentina. The SOA was founded for the express purpose of 
training Latin American military leaders in methods of counter subversion. In 1996, the 
Pentagon released an SOA training manual that outlined methods of interrogation and counter-
subversion, which included psychological warfare, torture, and arresting family members of 
suspects. Many of the most notorious participants in the Dirty War graduated from the School of 
the Americas. Alumni included Sergeant Elpidio Rosario Tejeda, who was known for his brutal 
methods of torture at the detention camp La Perla. According to later testimonies, the SOA was 
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considered to be such a prestigious institution that officers in the regime would brag openly 
about attending the school.79  
 
The Fall of the Junta and the Rise of Las Madres 
Virtually all military and political challenges to the regime were silenced by 1979, but the 
Junta was unable to deliver on its promise of stability. The regime’s economic policy of 
maximizing agricultural exports and industrial imports began to crumble, and by 1980 inflation 
spiked again. Videla handed the presidency over to General Roberto Viola, who hoped to 
facilitate a return to civilian rule. However, ultranationalist and conservative factions in the army 
wanted to completely block a return to civilian rule and pushed Viola out of the presidency. On 
December 12, 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri took office, and, hoping to distract from the 
catastrophic failure of Junta economic policy and a human rights crisis that was facing increasing 
international scrutiny, promised to focus his presidency on “issues of national honor and 
concern.”80 Galteri approved a plan to invade the Falkland Islands, which lie 300 miles of the 
coast of Argentina and had been occupied by the British since 1833. This decision would be the 
catalyst that ultimately brought about the end of the dictatorship.  
Galtieri assumed that the Islands were of no real importance to the British forces and did 
not expect major resistance to his military initiative. However, Margaret Thatcher demanded 
Argentina’s immediate withdrawal from the Falklands, and when Argentina failed to respond, 
launched a counter invasion. Galtieri expected US support or neutrality, as the US had been a 
passive supporter of the Junta. However, when the US sided with its longtime ally, Argentine 
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forces were compelled to surrender in a humiliating defeat that sealed the fate of the regime. The 
decision of the US to support Britain is one reason why relations between Argentina and the US 
remained constrained for years after the end of the Dirty War. The Argentine military was 
shocked and felt betrayed by the US support of Britain in the Falklands War. Not only had the 
two countries recently begun to have a positive diplomatic relationship, but in 1948 the US had 
signed an inter-American security accord which held that signatories would defend each other 
against external aggression. Reagan disregarded both the accord and the US relationship with 
Argentina when he sided Britain.  
In addition to the Falklands, an unexpected group of activists began to successfully resist 
the Junta. A group of women, mothers of those who had been disappeared, gathered on the Plaza 
de Mayo on April 30, 1977 to silently march and demonstrate. Their message was simple: Tell us 
where our children are. Perhaps the Junta did not perceive a group of housewives to be a 
sufficient threat to warrant an immediate and aggressive response, because Las Madres de Plaza 
De Mayo quickly gained influence and momentum. Las Madres immunized themselves against 
repression by making international connections that protected them from arrest, and by the time 
the Junta realized the danger of Las Madres, the activists were entrenched in Argentine Civil 
Society.81   
In her book on the legacy of the dictatorship in Argentina, Marguerite Feitlowitz claims 
that “the regime was eventually brought down, but not because of its record on human rights. 
Rather, it crumbled under the weight of its own corruption, economic mismanagement, and 
military incompetence.”82 In an attempt to salvage their political standing, the military 
announced that the war against subversives had been won, and confirmed its plans to turn 
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Argentina over to civilian rule. In a report released on April 28, 1983, the government 
proclaimed itself victorious in the war against subversion and expressed “genuine christian pain 
over any errors that might have been committed in the fulfillment of its assigned mission.”83  
Doctor Raul Alfonsín won the first election after the Dirty War and became Argentina's first 
democratically elected president since the Coup.  
Alfonsín’s position demanded that he facilitate a reconciliation process for Argentina. 
Shortly after taking office, he established the National Commission on the Disappeared, which 
attempted to promote healing and pursue justice by taking testimony from those who had been 
affected by the War. The report that the Commission released, titled Nunca Más! provided 
evidence to prosecute nine commanders of the first three Junta, in the most extensive and public 
trials of their kind since Nuremberg. Additionally, the report documented 8,960 desaparecidos. 
Despite the initial success of the Commission, Alfonsín’s fear of alienating a military that 
remained influential in Argentine politics, and of destabilizing Argentina by enacting wider-
spread prosecutions, impeded further investigations. The Commission was only designed to 
function for six months, and ultimately its term extended only to one year. Additionally, 
Alfonsín enacted two pieces of legislation that would essentially halt a justice and reconciliation 
process. The Due Obedience Law granted immunity to lower ranking military personnel, while 
the Punto Final Date imposed a sixty day deadline on new prosecutions. These laws remained in 
place until 2005, when they were ruled unconstitutional by the Argentine Supreme Court. Thus, 
the struggle to bring perpetrators to justice, reunite estranged families, and heal from the 
collective trauma of the Dirty War remains salient in Argentina to this day. 
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 Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo are a powerful manifestation of the way that the quest for 
reconciliation and justice has continued. The group remained active even after democratic rule 
was restored to Argentina. To this day, members of the organization return to the Plaza every 
Thursday to demonstrate. Wrapped in their signature white headscarves, Las Madres continue to 
demand answers that they feel were never given to them. While Thursdays at the Plaza remain 
consistent, the group has evolved significantly over the years. In 1986, the organization split into 
two groups. The first, led by Hebe de Bonafini, is now known as Asociación Madres de Plaza de 
Mayo. The other is called Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora. The distinction between 
the two groups is important, given that they split down ideological lines. Bonafini was against 
the prospect of receiving compensation of $275,000 for each child that was disappeared, saying 
“You cannot put a price on life. Also, to accept this compensation you have to sign a death 
certificate saying your child died. I cannot sign this as it is the people who took them who know, 
not me.”84 Bonafini’s statement alludes to the second ideological difference between the two 
groups; Bonafini is against forensic work to identify remains of victims; instead she wants to 
invest resources into bringing perpetrators to justice. Uranga Almeida, a member of Línea 
Fundadora, however, disagrees with this stance. She says “I respect Ms. de Bonafini’s opinion, 
but I need closure. I would like to touch Alejandro’s bones before I die.” 85 
The historical narrative of Las Madres, and the wider historical narrative of the Dirty 
War, is essential to bear in mind throughout an analysis of declassification diplomacy. Despite 
the violent, traumatic, and deeply personal nature of the Process, families of the victims have not 
been able to access details of what happened to their loved ones. While this project analyzes the 
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utility of declassification from an international perspective, it is essential to remember that 
nuances within Argentina’s domestic history and activist community remain at the forefront of 
the narrative of the State terror. The reality that The United States has information that could 
shed light on the dictatorship in a way that Argentina has not been able to do by itself, precisely 
because the US knew about, and was complicit in, the Junta’s crimes against humanity, should 
therefore be recognized with a degree of incredulity.  
 
A Rocky Relationship- the United States and Argentina After the Return to Democracy 
Since its inception, the relationship between the United States and Argentina could 
perhaps be summed up as Argentina pushing back against US attempts to exert power in 
Argentina and the region as a whole. Relations between the two countries became even rockier in 
2001, when Argentina suffered a massive economic meltdown and defaulted on 104 billion 
dollars in debt. Argentine President Kirchner would later blame the United States for this 
meltdown, an accusation that was not altogether unfounded. Leading explanations for the 
meltdown include Washington-backed neoliberal reforms during the 1990s, and the decision to 
bind the Argentine peso to the US dollar in an attempt to quell hyperinflation. Whatever the 
causes, it was the Bush Administration’s response to the desperate economic situation in 
Argentina that deepened anti US-sentiment in the country. As unemployment rose to 25%, GDP 
shrunk by almost a third, and the savings accounts and pensions of millions of citizens were 
destroyed, Argentine leaders pleaded with the US for an economic bailout.86 The Bush 
Administration, determined to end the Clinton Administration’s tradition of bailing out 
struggling Latin American economies, reacted sourly. In an interview with CNN, treasury 
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secretary Paul O’Neill  said “We are working to find a way to create a sustainable Argentina, not 
just one that continues to consume the money of plumbers and carpenters in the United States 
who make $50,000 a year and wonder what in the world we are doing with their money.”87 
Eventually, Bush agreed to an eight billion dollar bailout in exchange for the promise that 
Argentina would impose austerity measures and work with the IMF to restructure its debt.88 The 
agreement was too little, too late however, and at the end of 2001 the Argentina made the biggest 
default by any country in history and unlinked the peso from the dollar, devaluing it by 25%.  
Although the default alienated the United States as well as many other European lenders 
and foreign investors, it completely restarted the Argentine economy. Argentina's exports were 
boosted by a trade relationship with a quickly expanding China that paid high prices for 
Argentine resources. The devalued Peso made Argentina one of Latin America's most sought 
after and affordable tourist destinations, and by 2007 the economy had almost fully recovered. 
President Nestor Kirchner, and later his successor Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, were credited 
for the economic recovery and cultivated even more political support by encouraging anti-
American sentiment in Argentina- a tactic that has rarely failed to gain Latin American leaders 
political clout.89  
Ironically, given Bush’s contentious relationship to Argentina, the only other significant 
effort to declassify documents concerning the Dirty War took place during his presidency. Over 
4,000 documents were released in a declassification project that had spilled over from the 
Clinton Administration, yet this development did little to endear Bush, and by extension the 
United States, to the Kirchners. Activists in Argentina had asked for documents from the 
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Department of Defense and the CIA, believing that these departments had the most detailed 
knowledge of the crimes of the Junta. Yet the documents ended up being sourced exclusively 
from the State Department. Thus, Argentine activists were unsatisfied and there was no 
suggestion that these documents constituted a US attempt to take accountability for its role in the 
Dirty War. The documents did reveal significant and disturbing information, including that the 
US embassy in Argentina had carefully documented over 10,000 human rights abuses during that 
time period, and a testimony from a US citizen who had been subjected to horrific torture in an 
Argentine detention center, yet they did not have a major effect on the justice process in 
Argentina because the Due Obedience Law and the Final Point law had not yet been struck down 
by the Supreme Court.90 Additionally, any remaining hope for reconciliation between the two 
countries as a result of these documents was lost in the wake of the financial crisis.  
Bush’s disastrous visit to Argentina in 2005 is a clear manifestation of the climate 
between the two countries at the time. The visit sparked riots and protests throughout Argentina, 
Kirchner co-sponsored Hugo Chavez's counter summit, and publicly accused Washington of 
driving Argentina into its economic crisis of 2001. Bush was humiliated and did not return to 
Argentina for the remainder of his presidency.91 The inefficacy of the declassified documents in 
improving the relationship between the two countries underscores the reality that declassification 
does not automatically mean declassification diplomacy. Declassification is only an effective 
political tool if the circumstances allow it to be used as such, and if it is wielded conscientiously 
and in conjunction with other methods of outreach. Unlike Obama, Bush made no effort to cozy 
up to Argentina- and his attitude towards Argentine debt further alienated a country that was ill 
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disposed to feel sympathetic towards the US. The vast difference in both circumstance and 
attitude between Obama-era declassification and Bush-era declassification highlights the nuance 
required to make transparency an effective tool of statecraft.  
Obama avoided visiting Argentina through his entire first term in office, and well into his 
second term. His announcement that he would visit in Argentina in 2016 marked “the first 
bilateral visit to Argentina by a U.S. President in almost two decades.”92 The newly elected 
Argentine president, Mauricio Macri was far less openly hostile to the US than the Kirchners 
during his campaign. However, the loaded diplomatic history between the two nations, combined 
with the unfortunate timing of Obama’s visit with the 40th anniversary of the Coup that started 
the Dirty War, necessitated a major diplomatic olive branch if Obama’s visit was to be 
successful. Obama’s promise to declassify thousands of documents on the Dirty War marked the 
clearest case of declassification diplomacy in Latin America.  
 
Declassification Diplomacy and Obama’s visit to Argentina 
The announcement that Obama would visit Argentina on the anniversary of the coup was, 
predictably, met with criticism bordering on outrage by activists inside and outside Argentina. 
The comments of Hebe de Bonafini, head of Asociación Las Madres De Plaza de Mayo, in the 
Argentine news outlet Telesur exemplifies how closely the United States was associated with 
human rights abuses in Latin America. “I began to think about what country Obama represents 
and immediately Operation Condor jumped into my head. An operation that was designed, 
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orchestrated, and conceived by the United States.”93 Bonafi went on to say that Obama’s plan to 
visit the country on the anniversary of the coup was “Like a slap in the face to the history of the 
Argentines” and that “this man has hands that are stained with blood and we don’t want him 
here. Our organization, the Association of Madres de Plaza de Mayo, condemns with all its force 
the arrival of Obama to the country.”94 
 While Bonifini’s contingent expressed rage in response to Obama’s visit, Las Madres De 
Plaza de Mayo, Línea Fundadora, along with other human rights and advocacy groups, seized the 
opportunity to make demands of the US. Línea Fundadora co-signed an open letter to the US 
embassy, along with Abuelas de Plaza De Mayo, Centros Estudios Legales y Sociales, HIJOS, 
and Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos por Razones Políticas, all organizations dedicated 
to promoting justice in the wake of the dictatorship.95 The letter acknowledged the 2002 release 
of 4,705 documents concerning the dictatorship, and demanded more. The signatories attested 
that while the documents that had been released held both judicial and historical value, they 
exclusively came from the State Department. The groups requested documentation from the 
Military, the FBI, the CIA, and other federal Bureaus, because they expected that information 
from these Bureaus would provide more information about the detention centers.96 The advocacy 
groups that cosigned the letter to the Embassy were joined by Human Rights groups in the 
United States; Human Rights First drafted an open letter to the president that outlined the 
responsibility of the United States to declassify documents to make up for the role it played in 
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the dictatorship. The letter also explicitly referenced the diplomatic rewards that could come 
from heeding the requests of Argentine and American activists.  
The United States is in a unique position to assist the survivors of this brutal period 
in Argentina’s history by releasing government documents that pertain to it...The 
Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo... in coordination with other human rights organizations 
in Argentina, have been seeking documentation of what happened to their children 
and grandchildren for many years...We ask you now to assist the people of 
Argentina in their efforts to cast light on the human rights abuses that occurred 
during the dictatorship there. Declassified U.S. documents will help the people of 
Argentina understand the scope and consequences of the regime’s abuses, while 
also helping them acknowledge, mourn, and recover from that troubling and 
traumatic period...Argentina has a new, democratically-elected government that 
appears eager to work with and develop strong ties to the United States. An 
announcement from you that the United States, on the 40th anniversary of the onset 
of these atrocities...would represent a strong gesture of support for the new 
government, for the people of Argentina, and for the cause of human rights around 
the world.97 
 
This direct request for transparency underscores the reality that declassification of US 
government documents would be far more than a symbolic gesture. The United States would 
play a concrete and meaningful role in a major reconciliation process for Argentina. The letter 
from Human Rights First reveals that activists were aware of the impact that a declassification 
effort could have not just on human rights but on international politics. In addition to 
highlighting the diplomatic rewards of transparency, the letter suggests that the political climate 
in Argentina was conducive to accepting this sort of olive branch. Human Rights First references 
the election of centrist president Mauricio Macri, saying “Argentina’s new, democratically-
elected government that appears eager to work with and develop strong ties to the United 
States.”98 This astute observation highlights that Macri’s election was critical to the success of 
Obama’s declassification effort in Argentina.  
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The election of President Mauricio Macri illuminates why more radical advocacy groups, 
such as La Asociación de Las Madres, were so infuriated by the visit, and why the Obama 
Administration was willing to exercise the political will necessary to use declassification as a 
political tool to repair a relationship with Argentina. Macri’s predecessors included Nestor 
Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, both of whom consolidated executive power when 
in office and were known for their nationalist, anti-US rhetoric.99 Both Kirchners were wildly 
popular, and while domestically they promoted human rights and restored public trust in 
government, internationally they distanced themselves from the West, which eventually 
stagnated the economy.100 Mauricio Macri’s election symbolized a political shift toward the 
center. From the first hundred days of his presidency, Macri sought to restart the economy by 
softening Argentina’s stance towards potential foreign partners, namely the US. Obama’s visit 
exemplified this shift in Argentine foreign policy. In addition to the declassified documents, the 
two presidents discussed partnering to integrate Argentina back into the global market, Macri’s 
signing of the Paris Accords, and plans to combat drug trafficking in Argentina. The subject of 
the global threat of terrorism also occupied a prominent portion of a visit that was partially 
overshadowed by the terror attacks in Brussels on March 22. Macri’s policy goals of 
reconnecting to the global market and softening rhetoric concerning the United States 
complimented key characteristics of the Obama administration. First, like the Clinton 
administration, Obama’s presidency was marked by a more aggressive move towards 
transparency. Shortly after taking office, Obama signed Executive Order 13489, which rescinded 
some of the restrictions on transparency that had been imposed during the Bush presidency. On 
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his very first day in office, Obama declared, “For a long time now, there has been too much 
secrecy in this city. This administration stands on the side not of those who seek to withhold 
information but those who seek to make it known.”101 In addition to transparency, Obama sought 
to re-open the relationship not just with Argentina, but the region as a whole. Obama came to 
Argentina directly from a historic visit to Cuba, where he continued to promote opening ties 
between the two countries.  
Obama was open about the unique role that Argentina played in his efforts to strengthen 
US relations throughout Latin America. In the press conference with the two presidents, Obama 
said “We seek good relations with all the countries in the hemisphere but obviously Argentina 
historically as one of the most powerful largest countries in the hemisphere needs to be a critical 
partner with us.”102 Obama’s stance on transparency and Latin America combined to make the 
perfect incentive to use declassification as a form of diplomacy, while the drastic shift from the 
Bush to Obama aligned conveniently with the shift from Kirchner to Macri.  
The desire for connection between the two presidents was crucial to the success of the 
visit, and the declassification of documents facilitated the connection. Obama himself directly 
references the importance that physical action from the United States to aid in investigations had 
to rebuilding its ties in the region. At the press conference, he said:  
I do recognize that this week marks the 40th anniversary of the military coup. And 
tomorrow to underscore our shared commitment to human rights I'll visit the 
memorial of the victims... and recognize Argentina’s historic and continuing efforts to 
make things right...And to prove that this is more than just a symbolic gesture on my 
part...I'm launching a new effort to open additional documents from that dark period. 
We previously declassified thousands of records from that era, but for the first time 
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now we will declassify military and intelligence record as well...I hope that this 
gesture also helps to rebuild trust that may have been lost between our two countries. 
That's a principal gesture that I have not just for Argentina, but for the entire 
hemisphere. I came here from Cuba and we have put a great emphasis on making sure 
that some of the ideologies the disputes of past that they are frankly acknowledged, 
but we are also able to look for the future and not just behind us. And that's why this 
visit for me is so important.103  
 
By mentioning Cuba and Argentina's influence in the region in direct connection to the 
dictatorship and his plan to declassify documents, Obama explicitly tied his mission of 
transparency to his mission to reconnect to Latin America. This move required tremendous 
nuance; Obama used the promise of transparency to take responsibility for the past actions of the 
United States without actually apologizing. By refusing to condemn US actions in the region, 
Obama avoided apologizing and met Argentina halfway by acknowledging their national 
outrage. 
Obama’s use of declassification as diplomacy was not foolproof, and Macri’s impulse to 
repair ties with the US was not uncontroversial. A Pew Research Study released in 2015 revealed 
that only 43% of Argentinians had a favorable view of the United States, and this percentage has 
dropped 6-9 percent since 2015.104 Argentines who supported the Kirchners worried that 
improved relations between the two countries would mean that the US could exert too much 
influence over Argentina. The New York Times quoted a 28 year old music teacher named Elena 
Pensa, who disparaged the renewed positive relations between the US and Argentina, saying 
“It’s the same imperialist manual as always. We’ll lose sovereignty. They're giving away our 
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country.”105 Likewise, Axel Kicillof, former economy minister to Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner, said “We hope the government of Macri knows to serve the permanent interests of our 
country, not govern according to ideological criteria.”106 Thus, the diplomatic success of the visit 
did not carry through the whole country. While perhaps a closer relationship between the two 
countries was inevitable with the two presidents, the declassification of documents answered the 
demands of those who were far more skeptical about US involvement. It symbolized Obama’s 
integrity in his attempts to reinvigorate a relationship with the region, and it saved Macri from 
further criticism as he hosted the president on the anniversary of the coup.  
 
The Aftermath of Declassification 
 Obama authorized the declassification of thousands of CIA and Defense Department 
documents in 2002. The documents were expected “to shed significant light on the detailed U.S. 
knowledge of the repression during the dictatorship.”107 The project, which remains ongoing to 
this day, is being facilitated by the White House records management office and the Office of the 
Director of National intelligence. The full impact of these releases remains unclear, in part 
because the declassification effort is incomplete.  Thousands of documents continue to be 
reviewed for release under the Trump administration. Documents that have been released thus far 
include 1,078 pages primarily from the Jimmy Carter presidential library. They reveal internal 
disagreements within the administration, particularly between the NSC and the State Department 
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on how to carry out Jimmy Carter’s ultimately unsuccessful ambitions to prioritize human rights 
in the region, including Kissinger's efforts to challenge Carter’s human rights based policy, and 
Carter’s personal intervention to attempt to release a famous political prisoner in Argentina.108 
The Washington Post went so far as to say “The Argentina documents released so far indicate far 
less direct U.S. involvement and knowledge of the events leading up to the coup and subsequent 
developments, although previous releases, from the Ford administration, showed significant U.S. 
sympathy for the Junta.”109 
However, while the content of much of the documentation remains to be analyzed, the 
impact that the declassification effort had on the relationship with Argentina, and the 
implications of declassification diplomacy, remain salient. Obama milked the diplomatic tool of 
declassification beyond his initial visit. The first major release of documents in August of 2016 
was delivered personally to Macri by John Kerry when he visited Argentina and met with the 
president. Kerry promised “more to come in future.” Transparency organizations and media 
outlets applauded the diplomatic nature of the release. The National Security Archive in 
particular was vocal about its assessment of declassification diplomacy. Carlos Osorio, who 
directs the NSA’s southern cone project said “This release on Argentina marks an important step 
forward in the quest for truth, justice and historical accountability.”110 In regard to the timing of 
the announcement, Osorio said that the Obama administration demonstrated “tangible and 
concrete U.S. support for the pursuit of human rights and justice in Argentina.” Osorio framed 
Obama's use of “declassified diplomacy” as a way to reach out to human rights victims in 
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particular, saying that the effort “would be received as a gesture that opens paths of friendship 
and respect in the heart of Argentina.”111 Senior analyst Peter Kornbluh remarked, “The Obama 
administration has established a precedent and a pattern of using declassified diplomacy. 
Obama’s legacy, will include making the declassification of secret government records a creative 
component of U.S. policy to advance human rights.”112  
Kornbluh wrote an article for the Washington Post, titled “Why the Obama 
Administration is giving old State Secrets to Latin American Allies,” which framed Obama’s 
actions in Argentina in the context of declassification efforts of the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, as well as other declassification efforts of the Obama administration in Latin 
America. In addition to reducing tensions in Argentina, Obama used transparency to facilitate a 
growing trust between other countries in the hemisphere. In 2005 he acquiesced to a formal 
government request for records that remained secret and concerned Pinochet’s role in the car 
bombing of 1976, which killed two Allende aids in Washington DC. Vice President Biden 
offered a disc of declassified documents about repression in Brazil as a “peace offering” after 
President Rousseff canceled her visit to DC when she discovered that the United States had 
tapped her cellphone.113  
 Despite the efficacy of declassification as a method of statecraft, the internal politics of 
declassification show that transparency is not a straightforward tool to use. Peter Kornbluh, 
though unequivocal in his praise of the effort, qualified his expectations for the Argentina 
declassification project in his article in the Post, saying,  
The impact of this new diplomatic tool depends partly on the keepers of secrets 
in the U.S. intelligence community. Because the CIA cares more about 
protecting the covert nature of its operations than about diplomacy and the 
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accuracy of the historical record, the agency has not been eager to cooperate in 
these declassification projects...The CIA seems not to have gotten Obama’s 
directive that ‘no information may remain classified indefinitely.’ That 
position will be tested by Obama’s special declassification project on 
Argentina.114 
 
 In addition to unavoidable resistance from federal bureaus, Obama’s strategy, like all 
presidential decisions, invited political backlash. The Economist released an article in September 
of 2016 that articulated controversies about declassification diplomacy. The article suggested 
that “People who regard Mr. Obama as the United States’ “apologist-in-chief” think it 
strengthens their case.”115 A more nuanced criticism articulates hazards of politicized 
transparency: “Ironically, ‘here the US is intervening again, this time with a moral heavy hand,’ 
says Christopher Sabatini, a lecturer at Columbia University in New York. ‘That can reopen old 
wounds.’”116 By reopening past records, the US runs the risk of both “reopening old wounds” 
and exerting influence on the politics of the region. Sabatini referenced this concern in regard to 
Colombia, where a peace agreement between the government and FARC rebels held that fighters 
who confessed to human rights crimes would not serve jail time. Sabatini worried that secrets the 
US could release about FARC would disrupt a peace agreement that was essential to returning 
stability to the Colombia.117  
The United States has firsthand experience with the way that exposing information, or 
even opening an investigation, can drastically disrupt politics. Hillary Clinton herself claims that 
the announcement that the FBI was reopening an investigation into her emails had a major effect 
on the outcome of the 2016 Presidential election. Although nothing incriminating was found, the 
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email “scandal” highlights how even the mention of a possible investigation can drastically alter 
the political climate of a country.  Given how complex and charged transparency can be in 
domestic politics, it follows that the repercussions of transparency in international affairs are not 
only difficult to predict, but also could give the United States significant influence over another 
country's domestic politics- an outcome that would be begrudged particularly in Latin America. 
These complications, rather than refuting the efficacy of declassification diplomacy, 
underscore its utility as a diplomatic tool, and the political skill needed to wield that tool 
effectively. Obama could not have released these records on a whim. He needed to withstand 
criticism, both form those who thought the transparency effort is far too little, far too late, and 
those who considered him to be “apologist in chief.” He had to exercise his authority over the 
CIA, and to weigh the potential positive impact of declassification against potential political 
fallout between the US and Argentina, as well as disruptions to Argentina’s domestic political 
processes. Obama’s judgement that declassification would constitute a positive net benefit seems 
to have been correct; reestablishing a relationship with many countries in Latin America remains 
an essential, and underappreciated, legacy of Obama’s presidency. Obama’s effort to reach out to 
Latin America could be interpreted as a pursuit of international integrity, human rights, and 
mutually beneficial diplomatic relationships, or it could be considered a backhanded means of 
continuing to exert unwarranted power and influence in the region. Declassified diplomacy is 
either a weapon of coercion or an olive branch; both perspectives are essential to thinking 
critically about transparency as a political strategy.  
Obama’s visit to Argentina marked a massive turning point for the country as it 
reintegrated itself into the mainstream global community. Macri was clearly pleased by the visit, 
and even other government officials who had more Peronist views accepted Obama’s visit to the 
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country. Politicians from a vast array of political perspectives attended the state dinner in Buenos 
Aires at which Obama danced the Tango.118 Likewise, US-based human rights and transparency 
groups, including Human Rights First and the National Security Archive, considered the visit to 
be a success. However NGOs within Argentina continued to take umbrage with Obama’s visit, 
even after the declassification effort was announced. For groups like La Asociación de las 
Madres, transparency wasn’t enough, given that their objective remains focused on bringing 
perpetrators to justice, not merely historical reconciliation. Their viewpoint certainly has merit. 
During the press conference with Macri, a reporter from Argentine Newspaper, La Nación, asked 
Obama, “we would like to ask you what you think was the role of the US during the 
dictatorships...and whether you think there should be some self-criticism on the United States 
with regards to that role.”119 Obama’s meandering, indirect answer dodged the question as well 
as any suggestion of an apology. His answer, or lack thereof, challenges the assumption that 
Obama released the documents to make amends for US involvement in the dictatorship. Perhaps 
his initiation of a declassification process constituted a way for him to make up for past misdeeds 
without forfeiting power, yet it also seems that by releasing this information, Obama was able to 
gain influence without being held accountable as a representative of the United States. This 
perspective opens the possibility that declassification diplomacy could in part be a tool of 
coercion. It is perhaps not entirely justified to say that Obama used it as such, yet activists are 
certainly entitled to feel skeptical.  
                                                 
118 Davis, Julie Hirchfield, and Jonathan Gilbert. "Obama Declares a New Partnership After Talks With Argentine 
Leader." The New York Times, March 23, 2016, Americas. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/world/americas/obama-argentina-president-mauricio-macri-brussels-
attacks.html.  
119 The President and the President of Argentina Hold a Joint Press Conference. 
  
63 
The darker side of this use of classified information is exposed when we consider who 
has control over the narrative of state terrorism in Argentina. Unlike in Chile, the history of 
Argentina and the United States can perhaps be summed up as the Argentina actively, and for the 
most part successfully, challenging US influence and hegemony. Despite the obstacles of lack of 
evidence, amnesty laws, and a military that remained entrenched in politics, a vast amount of art 
and literature has been written and made by Argentinians as the country reconciles with it period 
of state terror. Argentina has been able to maintain its agency in the narrative of the Dirty War. 
Thus, Obama’s politicization of declassification reads less as an effective cool of coercion. 
Nevertheless, Obama’s failure to apologize for the United States’ role in the Dirty War sours the 
already uncomfortable reality that the United States maintains ownership of narratives that 
Argentina does not have access to. The United States continues to reach for underserved 
influence throughout Latin America by deciding when is the right time for these countries to hear 
the information that they have been entitled to for decades.  
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Conclusion 
I began this project to understand why the United States, even under Democratic 
administrations that claimed to promote transparency and human rights as central tenants of their 
administrations, was so reluctant to provide information that was desperately needed in Latin 
America to reconcile the difficult and painful history of human rights abuses in the region during 
the Cold War. Looking beyond the legal, technical complexities of the process of 
declassification, my intention has been to demonstrate how American administrations use 
transparency surrounding Latin America as a means to an end. As the cases of Argentina and 
Chile demonstrate, declassification and accountability are inextricably political, and are therefore 
only employed if the US has something to gain in the reconciliation process for Latin America.  
Although this project focuses on Argentina and Chile, the tactic of declassification 
diplomacy was employed by both the Obama and Clinton administrations throughout Latin 
America. Clinton ordered the release of 15,000 classified documents after the Washington Post 
published an exposé which revealed that the Reagan administration had approved El Salvadoran 
death squad operations, and published more records after the New York Times reported that the 
CIA had supported a Guatemalan colonel who orchestrated the assassination of an American 
expat hotel owner.120 Clinton’s impulse towards transparency (though not accountability) as a 
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response to scrutiny in these cases echoes his decision to launch the Chile Declassification 
Project. Obama’s declassified diplomacy in Latin America also reached beyond Argentina. In 
June of 2017, Joe Biden visited Brazil for the Rio Olympics, and brought with him a tranche of 
newly declassified documents to present to Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. The gesture was 
a necessary attempt to win over the disgruntled Rousseff, who had canceled her trip to the United 
States after she discovered that the National Security Agency had secretly taped her cellphone.121  
While I hope that future studies might trace this pattern beyond Latin America, I have 
chosen to limit my insights to this region for two reasons. First, because of the unconstrained and 
egregious nature of United States intervention in the region, and second, the worst of the human 
rights abuses in many Latin American countries took place more than 25 years ago, yet the 
reconciliation process in many of these countries continues to remain relevant today.  
Likewise, Clinton and Obama are the two US presidents who have used declassified 
diplomacy to the greatest degree- in part because their Democratic administrations have sought 
to build connections with Latin America far more than their Republican counterparts, and in part 
because both presidents were outspoken about their prioritization of transparency. However, the 
utilization of political declassification transcends partisan distinctions.  
While this project is primarily a story of a relationship between United States and Latin 
America, the implications of the politicization of transparency have important consequences to 
the internal politics of the United States. On February Second, 2018, The White House 
Intelligence Committee and Donald Trump authorized the release of a classified memo written 
by republican staffers on the house intelligence committee. In response, FBI director Christopher 
Wray released a rare public statement warning against the release of the document, saying that it 
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contained misleading information about the Russia Investigation. Bizarrely, the mainstream news 
media, which depends on transparency for its very survival, greeted the release of the memo with 
skepticism. The Los Angeles Times editorial board wrote an article titled “House Republicans are 
shamefully doing Trump's dirty work by vowing to ‘release the memo,’”122 which claimed that 
the move fell far short of true transparency. Other news outlets, including NPR and CNN seemed 
preoccupied with the conflict between the executive branch and the FBI, and the implications of 
whether or not Trump will be so transparent with the democratic memo that is also under 
consideration for release. 
 The counterintuitive hesitancy of the media and the partisan politics surrounding the two 
memos alludes to an unavoidable, yet not entirely self-evident, truth: Government secrecy in the 
United States is never straightforward and is often highly political. The Trump administration 
has been known for its unprecedented lack of nuance and tact. However, Trump’s use of 
classified information to exonerate himself, although clumsy, is far from unprecedented, and 
reflects the strategic behavior of both Clinton and Obama. The almost total power that the 
executive branch holds over classified material has made classified documents a valuable 
political tool for a variety of presidential administrations.  
 The use to which presidents put classified information is often clouded by the complexity 
of the declassification process. An automatic declassification program, which requires that 
classified documents over twenty five years old be reviewed for release, has been in place since 
1995, yet broad categories of exemption exclude millions of documents from review, and 
uncooperative federal agencies bog down review processes. Trump’s crude use of sensitive 
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material has demonstrated that in the Trump administration, the question of whether to keep 
information secret is political and partisan. As this project demonstrates, secrets are treated no 
less politically in more conventional presidential administrations; secrets are never released 
simply because they should be, and a president must have political incentive to prioritize 
declassifying information.  
The conclusion that declassification is inherently political does raise certain ethical 
concerns when thinking about the way that transparency is valued in democracies. In a speech to 
delivered to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Conference, former head 
of the CIA, Michael V Hayden described the role of a secret organization in a democracy, saying 
“As a secret organization serving an open and free society, CIA has been granted an enormous 
public trust. That’s what secrecy is in a democracy. Not a grant of power, but a grant of trust.”123 
Hayden’s reliance on trust seems insincere. A healthy democracy has institutions in place which 
ensure that its citizenry is not forced to blindly trust the integrity of its leaders, but constantly 
hold them accountable. FOIA, and Executive Order 12858 are two examples of institutional 
checks to the power of secrecy in the United States. It is necessary to consider who is affected 
when these checks are not effective, and transparency can be employed as a political tool for 
presidents to wield when it suits them. As this project demonstrates, those affected by political 
transparency in the United States are not merely its citizens, but entire nations who are forced to 
delay a process of reconciliation that should have taken place nearly half a century ago.  
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